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Recently D. MCCULLOUGH has shown [2] that a certain class of propo-
sitional connectives, called regular and defined in terms of Kripke's
semantical models, were all definable in the usual intuitionistic propo-
sitional calculus. This class of connectives has a certain naturalness to it
and might serve as the starting point of an attempt to (classically) answer
the question: What is an intuitionistic propositional connective 1 Our
intention here is to introduce an extension of LJp, the propositional
portion of Gentzen's intuitionistio sequentzen system LJ [1]. This ex-
tension incorporates additional propositional connectives together with
rules characterizing them, and is such that these new connectives cannot
be defined in terms of the original connectives ---', =>, v, and /\ (nor for
that matter in terms of each other). As a consequence, no interpretation
of this calculus in which these connectives are regular can be complete
with respect to Kripke's semantics. The principal tool in this proof is
the extension of Gentzen's Hauptsatz to the present system. This is then
used to show that the connectives form an independent set.
As indicated above, the system LJp is the propositional portion of
Gentzen's LJ. It has an infinite list of propositional variables p, q, r, e,
po, ... , together with the connectives v, /\, =>, and ---', and the auxilliary
symbol =>. Formulas are formed as usual, while sequents are expressions
of the form
where the Ai and BJ are formulas, n » 0, and 0<; m <;1. Proofs are given
in tree form, using axioms of the form A => A. The rules of inference are
the structural rules in III. 1.21 of [1] and the rules for introduction of
propositional connectives in III. 1.22 of [1]. The Hauptsatz for LJp is
the statement that the structural rule Cut is superfluous.
We will begin by considering the system LJ¢ obtained from LJp by
adding the binary connective ¢ (converse non-implication) together with
the following introduction rules:
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F=-A ¢B
B, F=- A
A¢B,F=-
¢-IS:
¢-IA:
A, F=- F=-B
Sequents, axioms, and proofs are just as for LJp.
As in the case of LJv- we prove the Hauptsatz not by showing directly
that the Cut rule is redundant, but that an equivalent rule Mix (cf.
III. 3.1 of [1]) can be eliminated. The structure of the proof is the same
as that for LJp, consisting of inductions on the rank e and degree y of
the given proof. (Cf. [1] for the full definitions of these terms. The degree
of A ¢ B is the same as the degree of A =:l B). Most of the argument is
unaltered; we need only consider the cases in which the last inferences
before the Mix to be eliminated are ¢-IS or ¢-IA.
Case 1: e= 2 and the inference is of the form:
A, F =- F =- B B, F =- A
¢-IS
F =- A ¢ B A ¢ B, F =-
---------------- Mix
This is replaced by:
F=-B B, F=-A
F* =-A Mix A, F=-
------------ Mix
F** =-
=== possibly several thinning!" md interchanges.
F=-
II=-A¢B
Both mixes here are of lower degree than the original.
Case 2: e>2.
Sub cas e 2. 1: The right rank is > 1 and the inference IS:
B, F=-A
---¢-IA
A ¢B, F=-
-------------- Mix
II, F* =-.
and contractions.
II=-A¢B
Since the right rank is > 1, we can replace this by:
II =- A ¢ B B, F =- A
----------Mix (on A¢B)
II, B, F* =-A
possibly several interchanges
B, II, F* =-A
¢-IA
A ¢B,II, F* =-
Mix
II 11* F* =-
" possibly several interchanges
II, F* =-
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Both mixes have lower right rank than the orig inal.
Su bcase 2 .2: The righ t rank = 1, the left ran k is > 1, and the
infer ence is :
B , r =- Ll,A
---- rt-1A
A rt B , r =-Ll II =>- E
----------- M ix
A rt B , r,II* =>- Ll *, E.
This case cannot occur since Ll must be empty and so ther e could be
n o mix-formula.
Su bcase 2.3: The right rank = 1, the left rank IS > 1, and the
inference is:
A, r -: r =>-B
------rt-IS
r =>-A rtB
----------------Mix
r, II* =- E.
This case also canno t occ ur since the left rank of th is figure is clearly 1.
Thus we have:
Theor em 1. The Cut rule is superflu ous in LJ¢.
To sh ow that the connect ives of LJ¢ are independent in LJ¢' we first
prove a series of lemmas.
Lemma A . Any p rovable sequent of LJ¢ has a cut -free proof con-
sisting only of reduced sequenis, where a se quent is reduced if no formula
occurs in the antecedent more t han three t imes.
Proof. This is an extens ion of Lemma IV. 1.21 of [1] and is proved
in the same manner.
Let T and F be the usual (clas sical) truth-values, and define p rt g to
take value T when p =F and g=T, and value F otherwise. We will call
a sequent AI, ... , An =- B , =-B, or AI, ... , An =- a tautology provided the
corresponding formula Al II . . . II An:) B, B, or Al II .. . II An :J (p II ----, p),
respectively, is a tautology in the usual sense. Then it is easy to verify
the following.
L emma B. Every provable sequent of LJ¢ is a tautology.
Corollary . The following se quent s are not provable in LJ¢ :
p =-g, p =-, =- p, p rt g =-, =>-p rt g,
p =-p rt g, g, p rt g =>-, g =-P ¢ g, p rt g =-p.
L emma C. p rt g =- r is not provable even if r is g.
Proof. By Lemma A, if p rt g =>- r wer e provable, it would have a
out -free proof consisting of reduced sequent s. By Lemma B , the last
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inference could not be a thinning, and since sequents in LJrj:. can have
at most one formula in the consequent, the last inference could not be
¢-lA. This leaves contraction as the only possibility:
But a similar argument shows that the only viable possibility for the last
inference to the upper sequent is again a contraction:
p ¢ q, p ¢ q, p ¢ q =- r
p ¢ q, p ¢ q, =-r
p ¢ q =- r.
But by Lemma A, this iteration can be carried no further. Then the
only possible inference to the uppermost sequent would be a thinning
on the left which is circular. Hence p ¢ q =-r is not provable in LJrj:..
Lemma D. Let p and q be distinct variables and let AI, ... , An be
distinct formulae containing no occurrences of the symbol ¢. Then not
all of the following sequents can be provable:
AI, ... , An =-p ¢ q
p¢q=-Ai, i=l, ... ,n.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the total number, K, of logical
symbols occurring in the Ai. If K = 0, the result follows immediately
from Lemma C. So assume that K> 0 and that some Ai, say AI, is of
the form B II 0, and suppose the Lemma false. Then in particular
p ¢ q =-B II 0 is provable. From Lemma A and the fact that consequents
can contain at most one formula, it immediately follows that p ¢ q =-B
and p ¢ q =-0 are both provable. Also B II 0, A 2 , ... , An =-p ¢ q and
B, 0 =-B II 0 are both provable, so by one application of the cut rule,
B, 0, A 2 , ... , An =- p ¢ q
is provable. But the total number of logical symbols in B, 0, A 2 , ... , An
is <K, contradicting the induction hypothesis. Thus we can assume that
no Ai is of the form B II O. Now suppose that each Ai is of the form -, At',
and that the Lemma fails. Then each of the following is provable:
-, AI', ... , -, An' =- p ¢ q(*)
(**) p ¢ q =--, At', i=l, ... ,n.
Consider the last inference to (*). It cannot be -. -lAo If it were a thinning
on the right, repeated use of (**), the cut rule, and contraction on the
left would prove p ¢ q =-, contradicting the Corollary to Lemma B. If it
were a thinning on the left, the induction hypothesis would be violated.
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This leaves contraction on the left or rf- -IS as possibilities, and so the
pattern must be:
p, -, A'il' ... , -,A\ =? -, A'kl' ... , -,A'kz =?q
--------------- rf--IS
-, A'il , ••• , -, A'kz =? P rf- q possibly some contractions and
-, AI', , -, An' =? p rf- q interchanges.
But from -, A'ki' , -, A'kl =? q and (**), by repeated use of the cut
and contraction rules, we can prove p rf- q =? q, contradicting Lemma C.
Thus not all of the Ai can be of the form -, At'. So some Ai, say AI,
must be either of the form B v C or B:J C. Suppose Al is B v C and that
again the Lemma fails. Then p rf- q =? B v C is provable, and by Lemma A,
it is easy to see that either p rf- q =? B or p rf- q =? C is provable. Since
B =? B v C and C =? B v C are both provable, it follows that both
B,A2 , ••• ,An =? p rf- q
and
C,A2 , ••• ,An =? p rf- q
are provable. Replacing Al by B or by C as is appropriate, we contradict
the induction hypothesis. Thus each Ai is either a negation or implication.
So suppose that Al is B:J C. Then p rf- q =? B:J C is provable, and so
by Lemma A,
(***)
is provable, as IS
B,p t «=?C
B:JC,A2 , ... ,An =?prf-q.
Now we must consider the patterns of inference leading to (t). As argued
above the last inference to (t) cannot be a thinning, nor can it be -, -lAo
This, by Lemma A, leaves two possible patterns:
(tt) B:J C, Ail' , A kz =? P rf- q possibly some interchanges and
B:J C, A 2 , , An =? P rf- q contractions.
Ail' , A kz =? P rf- q possibly some interchanges and
AI, , An =? p rf- q contractions.
Now (t) is not possible since Akl' ... , A kl =? q and p rf- q =? Ai, i = 1, ... , n,
lead to p rf- q =? q, contradicting Lemma C. For (tt), we first observe that
from Ail' ... , A ii =? Band (***), by using the cut rule, we get
Ail' ... , A ii, P rf- q =? C.
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Then using p ¢ q => A i, i = 1, ... , n , together with the cut and contraction
rules, we get
p ¢ q => 0 .
From 0 , Akl' ... , A kl => P ¢ q, by t hinning, we get
0 , A 2 , • • • , A n => p ¢ q.
Bu t now , replacing A l by 0, we con tradict the induction hypothesis.
This completes t he proof of t he Lemma.
Theorem 2. Th e connective ¢ is independent of t he ot her connectives
in L.1¢.
Proof. If not, there would be a formula A not involving ¢ such that
=> A = p ¢ q would be provable. By Lemma A, it would follow that both
A => p ¢ q and p ¢ q => A were provable, contradi cting Lemma D.
Th eorem 3. If the ca lculus L.1¢- is in terpreted in Kripke's model
stru ctures in such a way that L.1¢ is complete with respect to this in-
t erpretation and =>, -' , v, and 1\ are given their usu al in terpretations,
then the interpretation of ¢ cannot be a reg ular connect ive in the sense
of [2].
Proof. Suppose ¢ is in terpreted as a regular connect ive . Then t here
is a regular metalogical formula (cf. [2]) d (r p , q) such t ha t for all models
< G, R, I=> and all r EG,
Fi= p ¢ q iff .9/( [ , p , q).
But then by Theorem 2.1 of [2], t here exists a for mula A involving only
=>, -', v, and 1\ such that for all < G, R, 1= > and all T:« G,
«u; p, q) iff r l= A ,
and so
rl= p t « c= A.
Hence p ¢ q = A is universally valid, and so if L.1¢ were complete with
respect to this interpretation, => p ¢ q - A would be provable in L.1¢ '
cont radict ing Theorem 2.
The orem 4 . If => A ¢ B IS provabl e III L.1¢ , t hen both => B and
A => are provabl e in L.1¢.
Proof. This follows immediatel y from Lemma A.
Although => -, A = A => (p ¢ p) is provabl e in L.1¢ , it is possible to
prove analogues of Lemma D for the other binary connectives, leading to
Theorem 5 . The bin ary connec t ives of L.1¢ form an independent set .
Now consider the calculus L.1¢, I, t obtained from L.1¢ by adding t he
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binary connectives I (not both) and + (neither-nor), together with the
following rules for their introduction:
I-IA:
F=-A F=-B
AlB, F =-
I-IS:
{,-IA
A, F=-
F=-AIB
F=-A
A +B, F=-
B, F=-
F=-AIB
F=-B
A +B, F=-
+-IS
A, F=- B, F =-
F=-A {,B.
The proofs of the following theorems are analogous to those of Theo-
rems 1-5, and so we omit them.
Theorem 6. The Hauptsatz holds for the system LJrf., [ , t.
Theorem 7. Although =- p {, q = --, P 1\ --, q is provable, the binary
connectives of LJrf., I , t other than {, form an independent set.
Theorem 8. If the calculus LJrf.,j, t is interpreted in Kripke's model
structures in such a way that LJrf." I,t is complete with respect to this
interpretation and J, -', v, and 1\ are given their usual interpretations,
then the interpretation of I cannot be regular in the sense of [2]. Clearly
{, is regular.
Theorem 9, If =-AIB is provable in LJrf.,j,t, then either A=-
or B=- is provable in LJrf.,[,t. If =-A {,B is provable in LJrf.,I,J"
then both A =- and B =- are provable in LJrf., j, J"
Theorems 4 and 9 indicate that it may be reasonable to call the con-
nectives ct, I, {, introduced here intuitionistic connectives. For if we are
to have evidence that A is not implied by B, what better evidence can
we ask than evidence for B and evidence that A is absurd? Again,
Theorem 9 indicates that evidence for A IB consists either in evidence
that A is absurd or in evidence that B is absurd, and that evidence for
A {, B consists in evidence that A is absurd and evidence that B is absurd.
Since the sequentzen systems are constructed so as to separate the
roles of each logical particle, it appears evident that these new connectives
may be added to the full system LJ while still maintaining the Hauptsatz.
Finally, it also appears that imitation of the foregoing constructions should
allow one to construct similar n-place connectives for arbitrary n (and
perhaps even different sorts of quantifiers) all of which would be reasonable
candidates for intuitionistic connectives and which would all be inde-
pendent of one another.
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